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CY ER INSECURITY: T E
REASONA LENESS STANDARD IN INTERNET
OF T IN S DE ICE RE ULATION AND W Y
TEC NICAL STANDARDS ARE ETTER
E UIPPED TO COM AT CY ERCRIME
A STRACT
While the Internet of Things (IoT) has created an interconnected world
via phones, laptops, and even household devices, it is not infallible. As cyberattacks increase in frequency, affecting companies of all sizes and industries,
IoT device manufacturers have become particularly vulnerable, due in large
part to the fact that many companies fail to implement adequate
cybersecurity protocols. Mass data breaches occur often. However, these
companies are not held accountable due to the use of the reasonableness
standard in existing cybersecurity legislation, which is flexible and
malleable. In 2019, the California Legislature enacted a cybersecurity law
specific to IoT device manufacturers. This Note considers how the existing
California IoT legislation fails to hold companies accountable for poor
cybersecurity practices through malleable and relaxed standards, and
proposes a new standard of industry best practices which looks to a multistakeholder initiative to develop more rigorous standards to ensure
manufacturers undertake proper cybersecurity initiatives to protect
consumer data.
INTRODUCTION
“Like gods, we have created a new universe called cyberspace that contains
great good and ominous evil. We do not know, yet, if this new dimension
will produce more monsters than marvels, but it is too late to go back.”1

References to the Internet of Things (IoT) evoke fantastical images of
Heinlein-esque utopias2 more than they reveal the IoT’s true structure—a
vast network of connected devices with the capability to communicate with
other devices, networks, and the internet.3 While IoT enthusiasts praise the
unparalleled level of interconnectedness and rapid proliferation via new
applications such as home security systems, manufacturing, and even “smart

1. David Horsey, Internet universe contains both marvels and monsters, BALT. SUN (Aug 4,
2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/bal-internet-universe-contains-both-marvels-andmonsters-20150731-story.html.
2. Robert Anson Heinlein (1907–1988) was a famous American science fiction author who
often included political themes in his books. Robert Heinlein Biography, PEOPLE PILL,
https://peoplepill.com/people/robert-a-heinlein/ (last accessed September 20, 2020).
3. Most commonly, IoT devices include cell phones and laptops. Anmar Frangoul, The Internet
of Things: Why It Matters, CNBC (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/23/the-internetof-things-why-it-matters.html.

210

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

cities,” 4 the Utopian façade quickly melts away; its dystopian nature
manifesting itself as cybercrimes run rampant and consumers lose personal
data.5 In 2012, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Robert
Mueller stated, “[t]here are only two types of companies: those that have been
hacked and those that will be [,but] [e]ven that is merging into one category:
those that have been hacked and will be again.” 6 Oftentimes, device
manufacturers fail to implement adequate security features, leaving IoT
connected devices amenable to hacking.7 In 2018, the California legislature
sought to reign in a lawless IoT through Title 1.81.26 to Part 4 of Division 3
of the Civil Code (the IoT Security Law).8 Aiming to strengthen the security
of IoT devices by placing cybersecurity requirements on manufacturers of
IoT devices sold in California,9 the statute specifies that any device “capable
of connecting to the internet” that is sold in the state must have “a reasonable
security feature or features” designed to prevent unauthorized access.10
The flexible and indefinite standard in the California statute is the latest
in a long history of failed federal and state attempts to define and regulate
how companies handle cybersecurity practices in both the public and private
sector.11 Part I of this note addresses the history and growth of the IoT, the
background of cybersecurity in the United States, and the legal implications
of hacked IoT devices. Part II will then introduce the IoT Security Law and
will survey the use of reasonableness in tort law. This section will also
analyze existing cybersecurity laws and identify the weaknesses inherent in
cybersecurity legislation that incorporates reasonableness. Finally, Part III
proposes a new standard that replaces the reasonableness requirement with
technical standards that apply best practices as a minimum requirement. This
section will also propose an additional solution aimed to enforce these
technical requirements prior to prosecution by the Attorney General.
Specifically, California should create a multi-stakeholder entity comprised of
cybersecurity technical professionals, lawyers, and the California executive,
similar to that of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
4. Smart cities use IoT technology for various functions, including automated transportation,
control and oversight of energy and water systems and surveillance. Analytics Vidhya Content
Team, 10 Real World Applications of Internet of Things (IoT) – Explained in Videos, ANALYTICS
VIDHYA (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.analyticsvidhya.com/blog/2016/08/10-youtube-videosexplaining-the-real-world-applications-of-internet-of-things-iot/.
5. Larry Karisny, IoT Is Changing the Cybersecurity Industry, GOV. TECH. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.govtech.com/security/IoT-Is-Changing-the-Cybersecurity-Industry.html.
6. Stacy Cowley, FBI Director: Cybercrime will eclipse terrorism, CNN (March 2, 2012),
https://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology/fbi_cybersecurity/index.htm.
7. See Karisny, supra note 5.
8. The Senate Bill No.327 originally proposed the addition of Title 1.81.26 to Part 4 of Division
3 of the Civil Code. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.04 (West 2018)
9. Id.
10. Reasonable security features are defined as those “appropriate” to the “nature and function
of the device” and the “information it may collect, contain, or transmit.” Cal. Civ. Code, §
1798.91.04(a)(1)-(2)).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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(ICANN); this entity will first define the necessary technical best practices
and, subsequently, to ensure compliance with manufacturers’ cybersecurity
safeguards prior to a device’s data breach. This group will review protocols,
assess compliance, and provide oversight and guidance as to improvements
needed to meet the industry best practices. Implementation of these reforms
will incentivize compliance better than simple enforcement of the California
law, thus allowing the state legislature to better achieve its goals of
minimizing cyberattacks and data theft.
I

T E ASICS: T E IOT AND CY ERSECURITY

The IoT is “a giant network of connected things and people,” 12
comprising a myriad of connections between devices and the Internet.13 IoT
devices are built with various components that enable connections to the
Internet and allow for the transfer and collection of information. 14 IoT
platforms facilitate the connections among devices via data networks,
allowing for the transmission and aggregation of data from device-users.15
The IoT devices use Internet transfer protocols to transmit information.16
The allure of the IoT is in a large part due to the availability of data. Data
and information “is meticulously collected, stored, sold, manipulated,
repurposed[,] and reused” from IoT devices. 17 Private companies use the
information to understand individuals’ preferences, habits, and hobbies. 18
Furthermore, IoT devices aggregate data via “sensor fusion,”19 allowing for
data analysis of multiple devices and ultimately, a better understanding of
trends, people, and communities.20 Aggregated data is critical to companies
that collect, analyze, and use information for enhanced and pointed

12. Jen Clark, What is the Internet of Things?, IBM (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.
ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/what-is-the-iot/.
13. Id.
14. Ido Kilovaty, Freedom to Hack, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 466 (2019). Devices such as laptop
computers, smartphones, and even self-driving cars are built with software and sensors that enable
these devices to connect to an IoT platform. IoT sensors allow for the collection of data “about [the
IoT device’s] users and environment,” while the computer processing unit, commonly referred to
as a cloud, processes the collected data. Id. The third component of an IoT device, the actuator,
executes the actions commanded by the sensor and the cloud. Id.
15. IoT 101: What is an Internet Platform?, KAA, https://www.kaaproject.org/what-is-iotplatform (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
16. Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things?, BUS. INSIDER (May 10, 2018, 1:06 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-definition.
17. Janine Hiller & Jordan Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 309, 316 (2017).
18. Id.
19. Sensor fusion “dictates that the information from two disconnected sensing devices can,
when combined, create greater information than that of either device in isolation.” Scott Peppet,
Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security
and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 93 (2014).
20. Hiller & Blanke, supra note 17, at 316.
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marketing.21 It is not uncommon for IoT device users to become subject to
“aggressive advertising . . . surveillance capabilities[,]”22 or find that their
data has been sold to third parties.23 It is hardly surprising that the sensors
used to collect this information are referred to as “ubiquitous,”24 omnipresent
forces that are constantly working to collect information.25
The interoperability among IoT devices and the ability to provide
consumers with connectivity, convenience, and customization resulted in its
rapid worldwide proliferation.26 With each passing second, an additional 127
devices are connected to the Internet.27 It is predicted that in 2020, there will
be as much as 73 billion IoT connected devices.28 Sources even estimate that
by 2025, there will be more than 125 billion IoT devices worldwide.29 While
some of the explosive growth can be attributed to increases in cellular phone
usage and cellular device availability,30 a portion of this growth has resulted
from the expansion of the IoT into new economic markets and industries. IoT
markets fall into the following categories: industrial, retail, smart utilities &
energy, healthcare, “smart cities,” connected homes, wearables, connected
cars, and personal health. 31 IoT devices have expanded further into the
consumer market as connections to the internet have imparted new
functionalities on cars, home appliances, cameras, and even Apple
Watches.32 For instance, by connecting a car to the internet, drivers may soon
become obsolete as autonomous vehicles relegate car owners to that of
passenger.33

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Kilovaty, supra note 14, at 470.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
Devices can easily be modified and customized to achieve an individual user’s desired look
or function, and vendors use IoT devices to monitor and assess their products in the hope of
increasing revenue. The connections among devices via the IoT platform enable enhanced
communication that goes beyond the functionalities of typical online technologies. Id. at 470.
27. Kaylie Gyarmathy, Comprehensive Guide to IoT Statistics You Need to Know in 2020,
VXCHNGE (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.vxchnge.com/blog/iot-statistics.
28. This is a drastic increase from the 15.41 billion IoT connected devices in 2015, just five
years prior. Statista Research Department, Internet of Things - number of connected devices
worldwide 2015-2025, STATISTA (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iotnumber-of-connected-devices-worldwide/.
29. Gyarmathy, supra note 27.
30. Id. Some models forecast an approximately 3.5 billion cellular IoT connections by 2023. Id.
31. Jane Kirtley & Scott Memmel, Too Smart for its Own Good: Addressing the Privacy and
Security Challenges of the Internet of Things, 22 NO. 4 J. INTERNET L. 1, 8, 19 (2018).
32. For instance, the market for home IoT devices is expected to grow to 53.45 billion dollars
by 2022. Gyarmathy, supra note 27. Ronald Hedges & Kevin Ryan, The IoT: What Is It, What Can
Happen With It, And What Can Be Done When Something Happens, 90-APR N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 31
(2018).
33. Gyarmathy, supra note 27. “Automobiles now have built-in, computer-connected sensors
that tell the operator to brake or get back into his or her lane.” Hedges and Ryan, supra note 32, at
31.
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Industry leaders recognize the importance of IoT growth within their own
companies.34 Companies like IBM and Juniper forecast that IoT technology
will soon be integrated in 95% of new electronic designs.35 The staggering
amount of resources put into IoT development further support the view that
IoT is important for growth.36 Even the manufacturing industry has expended
significant time and resources on implementing IoT devices. 37 Further,
investment in the IoT is not limited to only the private sector. A growing
number of cities are also investing in “Smart City IoT Technology”38 for
tasks like measuring air pollution, identifying available parking stations, and
better connecting citizens to local governments. 39 Cisco, for instance, has
defined a “Smart City” as one utilizing “scalable solutions that take
advantage of information and communications technology (ITC) to increase
efficiencies, reduce costs[,] and enhance quality of life.”40 Companies, like
Amazon, invest in smart city technology and market technical solutions to
local governments.41 Crucial to the operation of smart cities is the role of
private sector technology companies in contracting with local governments.42
A CY ERSECURITY CONCERNS AND T E IOT
As the IoT becomes ingrained in various facets of our society, it is clear
that manufacturers and IoT platform providers do not take appropriate
cybersecurity measures to protect information that passes through devices
and networks. Data protection is crucial, as “[t]he most private and
nonintuitive pieces of information about a user are constantly connected by
IoT devices, and may enable misuse.” 43 A picture of the IoT is thus
34. Every nine out of ten executives who work in technology claim “IoT growth is critical to
their business.” Gyarmathy, supra note 27.
35. Kirtley and Memmel, supra note 31, at 8, 19.
36. Gyarmathy, supra note 27.
37. Id.
38. Id. Domestic cities like New York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Louisville, and Columbus all
use smart city technologies to innovate transportation, parking, and sustainable energy. Top 10
Smart Cities in the U.S., ROUTE MATCH (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.routematch.com/top-10smart-cities-us/.
39. Hiller and Blanke, supra note 17, at 311.
40. Hiller and Blanke, supra note 17, at 317 (quoting Gordon Falcon and Shane Mitches, Smart
Cities Framework: A Systematic Process for Enabling Smart + Connected Communities, CISCO, 2
(2012)).
41. Hiller and Blanke, supra note 17, at 316–17. The technology giant Amazon is intimately
involved with promoting Smart Cities through its Global City Teams Challenge, in which the
company provides resources to city teams with the goal of developing and implementing IoT and
Smart City Technologies. Amazon even goes as far as to feature its solutions in its Amazon Web
Services Marketplace, so cities “can easily understand, test, and adopt technologies that will
transform [their] city.” Smart City Solutions From the Global City Teams Challenge, AMAZON WEB
SERVS. MARKETPLACE, https://aws.amazon.com/mp/gctc/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
42. How can the private and public sectors work together to create smart cities?, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Jan. 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/ourinsights/how-can-the-private-and-public-sectors-work-together-to-create-smart-cities.
43. Kilovaty, supra note 14, at 472.
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incomplete without an understanding of common cyber threats and the
importance of cybersecurity in protecting users’ data. Unfortunately,
cyberbreaches are far too common. In 2017 alone, IoT cyberattacks increased
by more than six hundred percent.44
The size of a company has little influence on whether or not there will be
a cyberattack against it. 45 Since the early 2000’s, even billion dollar
companies like Yahoo!, Facebook, and Equifax have faced cyberattacks
which compromised millions, if not billions, of accounts.46 The California
Attorney General, after analyzing reports on over six hundred breaches
occurring between 2012 and 2015, concluded that in “2015 alone, nearly
three in five Californians were victims of a data breach.”47 The financial loss
to companies is just as staggering a statistic as companies lost two trillion
dollars from cybercrimes. 48 In response, there has been an increase on
cybersecurity spending in both the private and public sectors.49
The ramifications of a cybersecurity breach can have longstanding
effects on both a company’s financial health and its perception by the
public.50 Financial costs include compensation to customers and declines in
share value, leading to lost revenue. 51 Notably, damage to a company’s
reputation and a loss of trust among customers can reduce future growth and
customer base.52 Additionally, in the event of a data breach, many companies
are subjected to “hidden costs” in the form of regulatory fines, lawsuits, and
investigations brought by government agencies like the Federal
Communications Commission.53

44. Nick Galov, Cyber Security Statistics for 2019, CYBER DEFENSE MEDIA GRP. (Mar. 21,
2019), https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/cyber-security-statistics-for-2019/. Additionally, it
is estimated that there is a cyberattack once every fourteen seconds, with an average chance of being
attacked within the first five minutes of connecting an IoT device. Matt Powell, 11 Eye Opening
Cyber Security Statistics for 2019, CPO MAG. (June 25, 2019), https://www.
cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/11-eye-opening-cyber-security-statistics-for-2019/.
45. Shena Tharnis, As Cyber Attacks Become More Prevalent, Here’s Why Your Small Business
is at Risk, SEC. MAG. (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/91806-as-cyberattacks-become-more-prevalent-heres-why-your-smallbusiness-is-atrisk#:~:text=In%20fact%2C%20cyberattacks%20on%20small,according%20to%20a%20recent%
20report. “In fact, cyberattacks on small businesses are more common than many think, with more
than two-thirds (67%) of companies with fewer than 1,000 employees having experienced a
cyberattack, and 58 percent having experienced a breach, according to a recent report.” Id.
46. Powell, supra note 44
47. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017).
48. Powell, supra note 44. By 2021, this number is expected to reach more than double that
amount. Galov, supra note 44.
49. The cybersecurity market is expected to reach $300 billion by 2024. Powell, supra note 44.
50. Maddie Davis, 4 Damaging After-Effects of a Data Breach, CYBINT SOLS. (July 25, 2019),
https://www.cybintsolutions.com/4-damaging-after-effects-of-a-data-breach/.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Data Security Breach: 5 Consequences for Your Business, AME GRP., https://www.
theamegroup.com/security-breach/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
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The “complexities” of the IoT “magnify cyber risk.”54 Vast connections
among devices mean a single device’s vulnerability55 waterfalls down the
IoT, infiltrating all connected devices.56 A single device can infect Wireless
Fidelity connections, operating systems, and clouds.,57 allowing cyberattacks
to move upstream and waterfall back down to other devices.
How then, should governments regulate IoT technologies and ensure that
companies implement adequate cybersecurity safeguards? One school of
thought argues that regulation now could be “premature,” “overly rigid,” and
ultimately, a hindrance to the various IoT markets. 58 Referred to as
“permission-less innovation,” some scholars assert that the value of IoT to
society and the economy warrants minimal regulation, allowing companies
to experiment and develop IoT technology as they please.59 To some extent,
a viewpoint that favors minimal regulations is reactionary because future
problems should instead be addressed if, and when, they occur.60 The role of
the government under the permission-less innovation view is not one of
inaction, but instead, promotion.61 Alternatively, a precautionary approach
advocates for harsher regulations on IoT devices to secure information and
ensure only necessary data remains on IoT devices for extended periods of
time.62
II T E CALIFORNIA IOT DE ICE LE ISLATION AND T E
REASONA LENESS IN CY ERSECURITY LAW
The IoT Security Law 63 is the first law to place cybersecurity
requirements on IoT manufacturers selling devices within the state.
California enacted the legislation due to data privacy and security concerns
surrounding the collection of sensitive data by IoT devices, which are often
compromised by a cyberattack.64 The law is designed to protect consumers,
who are unaware of the vast amounts of data collected in the IoT and the
likely chance of a cyberbreach.65

54. Gary Eastwood, 5 of the Biggest Cybersecurity Risks Surrounding IoT Development, IDG
(June 27, 2017, 11:32 AM), https://perma.cc/5D4P-2FC8.
55. Kirtley and Memmel, supra note 31, at 19.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers May Clean Your Clothes, But Hacks Can Clean Out Your
Privacy, and Underdeveloped Regulations Could Leave You Hanging on a Line, 32 J. MARSHALL
J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 259, 267 (2016).
58. Adam Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and
Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH 6, 36 (2015).
59. Id. at 39.
60. Id. at 40.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.04-06 (2018).
64. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017).
65. Id.
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Written to align with California’s data breach notification laws, 66 the
legislature deemed the IoT Security Law as “common sense,” and drafted its
provisions to allow for the flexible nature of technology.67 The IoT Security
Law applies to manufacturers of connected devices that are sold or offered
for sale in California, as well as entities that contract with a manufacturer to
produce products on its behalf.68 Exemptions also exist for various categories
of businesses.69
The IoT Security Law’s legislative history provides an almost laughable
but poignant example of IoT device’s security vulnerabilities in “My Friend
Cayla” dolls, which are equipped with IoT and Bluetooth technologies.70 The
dolls ask children for personal information like their school names, addresses,
and parents’ names.71 The commentary notes that Bluetooth technology is
amenable to hacking, which could lead to theft of personal information or the
programming of a doll to “utter obscenities or even speak directly to children
through the doll from up to 50 feet away.”72 The legislature doubted that a
toy manufacturer would take adequate cybersecurity safeguards (or incur the
extra costs) to protect the tween dolls without adequate government
regulations.73
Through the IoT Security Law, California regulates IoT device
manufacturers with products sold in the state by subjecting them to
“reasonable” security features that must be appropriate (1) “to the nature and
function of the device”, and (2) “to the information it may collect, contain,

66. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 (2018).
67. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017). To address these innovations and their attendant
risks, [the] bill sets out requirements concerning the security of such devices . . . [requiring]
manufacturers to ensure these devices are equipped with reasonable security features to protect both
the device and the information collected. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017).
68. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.04 (2018).
69. Exemptions include “unaffiliated third-party software or applications that a user chooses to
add to a connected device; providers of an electronic store, gateway, marketplace or other means of
purchasing or downloading software or applications and entities or individuals subject to HIPAA or
the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act with respect to any activity regulated by those acts.”
Cal. Civ. Code, § 1798.91.06 (2018); see also Sharon Klein, et al., California Becomes First State
to
Regulate
IoT
Devices,
TROUTMAN
PEPPER
(Oct.
3,
2018),
https://
www.troutman.com/insights/california-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-iot-devices.html.
70. IoT and Bluetooth features in the “My Friend Cayla” dolls allow it to communicate with
children using an Internet connection. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017).
71. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017). The idea of high-tech and potentially dangerous IoT
dolls is a concept that has also been explored in pop culture, most notably through the 2019 remake
of the classic horror movie Child’s Play. While the original movie reveals that Chucky has been
brought to life through evil spirits, the rebooted Chuckie is” a walking, talking smart device” with
“all his safeguards removed by a vengeful factory worker.” Richard Jordan, Child’s Play director
on upgrading Chucky for the AI era, DEN GEEK (June 25, 2019),
https://www.denofgeek.com/movies/child-s-play-director-on-upgrading-chucky-for-the-ai-era/.
72. Legis. Bill. Hist. C.A. S.B. 327 (2017).
73. See generally Theo Douglas, California Governor Approves Bills Tightening Security,
Privacy of IoT Devices, GOV’T TECH. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.govtech.com/applications/
Two-Bills-Before-California-Governor-Would-Tighten-Security-Privacy-of-IoT-Devices.html.
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or transmit.”74 The legislation specifies that in light of these requirements,
IoT devices will meet the “reasonable” qualifications if: “(1) [t]he
preprogrammed password is unique to each device manufactured” or “(2)
[t]he device contains a security feature that requires a user to generate a new
means of authentication before access is granted to the device for the first
time.”75
Use of the term “reasonable security features” in the IoT Security Law,
and the subsequent examples for satisfying the requirements, introduce
questions related to the effectiveness of the law in preventing cyberbreaches
and protecting consumers’ personal data. It remains unclear whether
incorporation of the term “reasonable” to the statute will strengthen the
security of IoT devices to achieve the law’s objectives. By abstractly defining
“reasonable security features,” the legislature failed to account for the various
industries and applications of IoT devices, thus failing to provide clear
guidance to help companies comply. An abstract definition leaves everyone
involved in the IoT infrastructure subject to the California Executive’s
interpretation of the words, however, neither the Attorney General nor the
State has issued guidance as to how the law will be interpreted.76
A UNDERSTANDIN REASONA LENESS
A brief background on the use of “reasonableness” in the general practice
of law is necessary for insight as to the effectiveness of the term in the IoT
Security Law. Often referred to as a “rule of reason,” 77 the standard of
reasonableness provides a means for the “application of community
standards” in various contexts. 78 Courts use reasonableness to determine
legal standards that reflect commonalities among industries, as well as what
is “good” by constructing and asking what a reasonable person or company
might do.”79 In some ways, the notion of reasonableness involves “thinking
about both what people actually do and what people should do.”80
The reasonableness standard is perhaps best known in tort law.
Specifically, the tort of negligence incorporates the standard by asking
whether a defendant took reasonable care. 81 Two different approaches to

74. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.04(a)) (2018). Systems must also be “[d]esigned to protect the
device and any information contained therein from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure.” Id.
75. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.04(b)) (2018).
76. Jason Tashea, California imposes new regulations on “internet of things devices,” A.B.A.
J. (Dec. 10, 2018), www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_california_imposes_regulations_on_the
_internet_of_things.
77. David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 525 (2011).
78. Id. at 527.
79. Kevin Tobia, Legal Standards Invoke the “Reasonable Person.” Who is it?, AEON (Jan. 25,
2019), https://aeon.co/ideas/legal-standards-invoke-the-reasonable-person-who-is-it.
80. Id.
81. Kevin Tobia, How People Judge What is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293, 298–300 (2018).
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interpretation of the reasonable standards exist: some assess reasonableness
by what is common (the statistical approach), 82 while others focus on
reasonableness as what is good (the prescriptive approach).83 The statistical
approach takes a more rigid and mathematical approach, while a prescriptive
approach looks to balance the benefits and detriments to those within a group.
Neither approach is rooted in expertise within a specific industry or field, but
instead are focused on the average perspective. Thus, a reasonable or
acceptable practice is not a reflection of best practices, but rather a general
consensus.
CY ERSECURITY RE ULATION USIN REASONA LENESS
While the IoT Security Law is unique in that it focuses on manufacturers,
the law resembles existing cybersecurity legislation that also incorporates
standards of reasonableness. Governments at both the federal and state levels
have enacted cybersecurity legislation to regulate private entities that handle
sensitive information like personal health information and financial data.
Weaknesses present in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA)84 and cybersecurity regulations promulgated by the
New York Department of Financial Services (NYFDS)85 reflect the need for
regulations that incorporate stricter security standards beyond mere
reasonability.
IPAA
HIPAA resulted from Congress’ desire to decrease healthcare costs by
minimizing fraud and abuse within the healthcare industry. 86 Medical
records, for instance, are purported to be valued on the black market at more
than ten times that of the going rate for other personal information like credit

82. The statistical approach “focuses on defining the appropriate standard of precautions to be
taken” by looking at how people typically act in a similar situation. It considers what a hypothetical
average person might do as a standard for what constitutes the requisite level of care. It does not
take into account the expertise or perspective of judges in setting the standard. Id. at 299, 301.
83. The prescriptive approach incorporates multiple theories, such as a cost benefit analysis
related to welfare maximization, and community values. Id. at 302.
84. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b),
164.514(d) (2017) [hereinafter HIPAA].
85. Compilation of Codes, Rules, and Regulations of the State of New York Currentness, 23 NY
ADC 500.0 (2017) [hereinafter NYCRR 500].
86. HIPAA’s associated House Report chronicles the Federal Government’s attempts to
“improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual
markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote
the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to
simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes,” H.R. Rep. No. 104-496, at
69–70 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 1865 at 1869. See also Deborah Buckman, Validity,
Construction, and Application of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. FED. 133, 134 (2004).
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cards.87 Medical records contain sensitive information, known as personally
identifiable information (PII), and HIPAA guidelines seek to protect this
information by placing security requirements on health care providers, plans,
and third parties, such as billing companies.88
Unlike the IoT Security Law, HIPAA does not regulate manufacturers.
Title II, Section F of HIPAA lays out the purpose of the law, which includes
“standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain
healthcare information.”89 Companies covered under HIPAA are required to
perform a risk analysis and management in order to determine if security
requirements are reasonable and appropriate. 90 Reasonable steps include
evaluating “the likelihood and impact of potential risks to [electronic
personal health information],” 91 “implementing appropriate security
measures to address the risks identified in the risk analysis,” 92 and
“documenting the chosen security measures and . . . the rationale for adopting
those measures.”93 Companies must also maintain “continuous, reasonable,
and appropriate security protections.”94
Reasonableness requirements recognize that different entities face
unique cybersecurity risks. 95 “What is appropriate [or reasonable] for a
particular covered entity will depend on the nature of the covered entity’s
business, as well as the covered entity’s size and resources.” 96 If a cyber
breach occurs, entities under HIPAA “must take reasonable steps to cure the
breach or end the violation.”97 The reasonable and appropriate aspects of the
security rule are flexible in that they can be manipulated as long as the
“objectives of the requirement” are achieved. 98 Some software companies

87. Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record is Worth More to Hackers than Your
Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurityhospitals/your-medical-record-is-worth-more-to-hackers-than-your-credit-cardidUSKCN0HJ21I20140924.
88. Glyn Cashwell, Cyber-Vulnerabilities & Public Health Emergency Response, 21 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 29, 38 (2018).
89. HIPAA § 261. The efforts devoted to developing HIPPA standards with an electronic focus
highlight not only the rising prevalence of technology in the healthcare industry at the time, but the
potential for increased fraud and abuse within the healthcare industry stemming from the availability
of medical records in an electronic format.
90. Cashwell, supra note 88, at 38.
91. HIPAA § 164.306(b)(iv).
92. HIPAA § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B).
93. HIPAA § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1); HIPPA § 164.316(b)(1).
94. HIPAA § 164.306(e).
95. Summary of the HIPAA Security Rules, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2019).
96. Id.
97. HIPAA § 164.314(a)(1)(ii).
98. Breaking Down the HIPAA Security Rule, ACCOUNTABLE (June 2, 2020),
https://www.accountablehq.com/post/breaking-down-the-hipaa-security-rule.
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even provide online guidance as to how a company can “bend the security
rule ‘reasonably’ and ‘appropriately.’”99
The adequacy of the HIPAA security rule is called into question when
considering the sheer number of data breaches within the healthcare sector
each year. In 2019, for example, reports from the United States Department
of Health and Human Services published a list of 418 HIPAA breaches that
occurred from email breaches and server hacking that led to the compromise
of personal data belonging to over 34 million Americans.100
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for enforcing HIPAA
compliance and investigating companies who violate the law.101 However,
“[t]he vast majority of cases investigated by OCR arise from complaints
received rather than from OCR’s own fact-finding investigations.” 102 If a
violation is confirmed, rather than issue fines or impose sanctions on entities
who fall under HIPAA, “OCR takes an active role in working with the entities
investigated to reform practices that do not comply with HIPAA
regulations.” 103 In 2014, for example, only seven percent of all cases
investigated resulted in a corrective action. Further, there have been 73,288
instances total in which OCR did not take action and investigate potential
HIPAA violations.104 In these instances, OCR independently determined it
could not take action because it “did not have the jurisdiction to investigate
the entity subjected to the complaint or the perceived privacy violation was
simply not covered under HIPAA.”105 This included complaints that were not
filed within the requisite time period.106
Despite HIPAA’s security requirements, numerous breaches and
investigations endure, and in some instances, institutions previously
investigated by OCR continue to violate the law; in 2019, the University of
Rochester Medical Center paid a multi-million dollar fine for failure to
encrypt its mobile devices like flash drives and laptops, which led to
disclosure of protected data years after a previous investigation for a similar

99. See HIPAA: How to bend the security rule ‘reasonably’ and ‘appropriately,’ CALYPTIX
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.calyptix.com/regulations/hipaa-how-to-bend-the-security-rulereasonably-and-appropriately/.
100. Hoala Greevy, HIPAA breaches in 2019: A year in review, PHYSICIANS PRAC. (Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.physicianspractice.com/view/hipaa-breaches-2019-year-review.
101. See generally Enforcement Process, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 17, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/enforcementprocess/index.html.
102. The Ultimate HIPAA Guide: The Facts You Need to Know, EVISIT, https://
evisit.com/resources/hipaa-guide/#7 (last accessed Oct. 5, 2020).
103. In more than 24,047 cases, OCR resolved the matters by identifying and assisting entities or
companies with implementing corrective practices to ensure that they do not repeat the same
violations. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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issue. 107 Thus, HIPAA’s reasonability-focused compliance standard fails to
protect peoples’ medical records.
T

N Y
NYDFS

S

D

F

S

The New York state legislature in turn has focused on reasonability in its
efforts to regulate the security practices of private financial institutions.
NYDFS’s Cybersecurity Regulation, 108 for example, places cybersecurity
requirements on certain financial institutions109 operating within the state,110
and incorporates reasonable notification requirements in the event of a cyber
breach.111 The NYDFS commented on the reporting requirements, defining a
“reasonable likelihood of material [harm]” 112 to include “unsuccessful
attacks that appear particularly significant based on the Covered Entity’s
understanding of the risks it faces.”113 Unlike HIPAA, the NYDFS remains
overall, deferential to private financial services, trusting that “Covered
Entities will exercise appropriate judgment as to which unsuccessful attacks
must be reported and does not intend to penalize Covered Entities for the
exercise of honest, good faith judgment.”114 What constitutes a reasonable
notification, then, is left to a financial institution’s own judgement. As a
result, the NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation not only substitutes government

107. “In 2010, OCR investigated URMC concerning a similar breach involving a lost
unencrypted flash drive and provided technical assistance to URMC. Despite the previous OCR
investigation, and URMC’s own identification of a lack of encryption as a high risk to ePHI, URMC
permitted the continued use of unencrypted mobile devices.” Research Center’s Failure to Encrypt
Mobile Devices Leads to $3 Million HIPAA Settlement, SEC. MAG. (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/91236-failure-to-encrypt-mobile-devices-leads-to-3million-hipaa-settlement.
108. 23 NYCRR 500.
109. These financial institutions are referred to as “Covered Entities” under the legislation. See
generally 23 NYCRR 500.
110. Juliana De Groot, What is the NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation? A Cybersecurity
Compliance Requirement for Financial Institutions, DIGIT. GUARDIAN DATA INSIDER (Oct. 24,
2019), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-nydfs-cybersecurity-regulation-new-cybersecuritycompliance-requirement-financial.
111. Id. Specifically, “[e]ach Covered Entity shall notify the superintendent as promptly as
possible but in no event later than 72 hours from a determination that a Cybersecurity Event has
occurred that is either of the following: . . . (2) Cybersecurity Events that have a reasonable
likelihood of materially harming any material part of the normal operation(s) of the Covered Entity.”
23 NYCRR 500.17(a)(2).
112. 23 NYCRR 500.17(a)(2).
113. “The [NYDFS’] notice requirement is intended to facilitate information sharing about
serious events that threaten an institution’s integrity and that may be relevant to the [NYDFS’]
overall supervision of the financial services industries,” and thus may extend beyond solely the
effect of causing “material consumer harm.’” FAQs: 23 NYCRR Part 500 – Cybersecurity, N.Y.
STATE DEP’T. FIN. SERVS., https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/cyber_faqs (last visited Oct.
26, 2019).
114. Id.
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oversight for private company discretion, but at no point “purport[s] to judge
a cybersecurity program’s quality”115
Further, since enacting the legislation in 2017, the State of New York has
hesitated to enforce the law and did not file its first set of charges until July
2020, approximately two years after the breach in that case.116 Here, First
American Title Insurance Company experienced a breach resulting from a
cyber vulnerability, which led the NYDFS to accuse the company of violating
six provisions of the regulations.117 However, there are significant issues with
the charges because they do not reference particular aspects of the regulations
that were not met, but instead argue that the company’s cybersecurity
program was inadequate.118 What purpose, then, does this regulation serve if
it provides no guidance as to how a company should structure its
cybersecurity program or the minimum requisite features that must be met to
avoid penalty?
C COURT E ALUATIONS OF T E REASONA LENESS STANDARD
A vague characterization of the term “reasonable” by both federal and
state legislatures is paralleled in the approach taken by courts and agencies.
Experts argue that although both technical and legal professionals understand
that reasonable cybersecurity features are required, there is no adequate
definition of what is “reasonable.”119 As a starting point, some claim that
“reasonableness is defined by your company itself. You have to start the
process with a risk assessment . . . you have to prioritize, [and] you have to
develop a plan. Then you implement appropriate policies, procedures, tools,
[and] strategies.”120 Some legal experts have commented that defining the
reasonable standard is an exhaustive task that can best be done by
summarizing what a reasonable cybersecurity feature is not.121
Rather than provide a precise definition of the reasonableness standard
in the context of cybersecurity, some courts established tests to determine

115. Peter Jaffe, Problems with New York’s first enforcement action under its financial cyber
regulations, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (July 24, 2020), https://digital.freshfields.com
/post/102gc63/problems-with-new-yorks-first-enforcement-action-under-its-financial-cyber-regul.
116. Chris Brook, NYDFS Charges First Company for Violating its Cybersecurity Regulation,
DIGIT. GUARDIAN (July 30, 2020), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/nydfs-charges-first-companyviolating-its-cybersecurity-regulation.
117. Id.
118. See Jaffe, supra note 115.
119. Bruce Sussman, Cyberlaw 2019: How Courts See ‘Reasonable Cybersecurity’,
SECUREWORLD (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/reasonablecybersecurity-2019.
120. Id. Data privacy attorney Shawn Tuma has even likened a demonstration of reasonable
security to an elementary math class, in that it is up to companies to themselves show the process
they go through to implement cybersecurity features. Id.
121. Rick Lazio & Mike Davis, Cybersecurity Risk: What does a ‘reasonable’ posture entail and
who says so?, CIO DIVE (July 22, 2019), https://www.ciodive.com/news/cybersecurity-risk-whatdoes-a-reasonable-posture-entail-and-who-says-so/559207/.
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whether a company undertook reasonable cybersecurity efforts in the course
of its business and in protecting customer data. Of special note is the
commonly used “risk/utility” test122—a balancing test that asks if the benefits
of implementing cybersecurity features outweigh the burdens and costs of
putting those features into place prior to a cyberattack.123 In In re Adobe Sys.
Privacy Litig., 124 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose division, ruled that plaintiff customers of Adobe had
standing to assert claims that the company did not maintain reasonable
security measures to protect the customers’ personal information, since the
risk that the customers’ personal data would be misused by hackers was
immediate and very real, and the customers incurred costs to mitigate the risk
of harm.125 The suit arose out of a July 2013 data breach that occurred when
Adobe’s servers were hacked, compromising the personal information the
company collected from its customers, including names, emails, and credit
card numbers.126 For weeks, the hackers extracted data from servers before
third-party security researchers alerted Adobe to the breach. 127 An
independent third-party research organization later discovered Adobe source
code on the Internet and also alerted Adobe that “researchers [had] concluded
that Adobe security practices were deeply flawed and did not conform to
industry standards.” 128 Adobe’s encryption protocol lacked the requisite
strength to protect the customer information, and “Adobe similarly failed to
employ intrusion detection systems, properly segment its network, or
implement user or network level system controls.”129
The plaintiffs in that case brought a cause of action for violations of parts
of the California Civil Code known as the Customer Records Act (CRA).130
While the court did not specifically rule on whether Adobe’s cybersecurity
practices were reasonable upon summary judgment, the court did speak to
what it considered during a reasonability analysis.131 The court identified that
there was an immediate and real risk that the plaintiffs’ personal data would
be misused by hackers in the event of a breach.”132
122. The risk/utility test looks to see “whether a defendant’s conduct was reasonable and
conformed to others similarly situated in the same industry and if the potential harm outweighs the
burden of implementing the proper measures to prevent such harm.” Id.
123. See generally Lazio and Davis, supra note 121.
124. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
125. Id. at 1217.
126. Id. at 1206.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1207.
129. Id.
130. The statute stated the following: “A business that owns, licenses, or maintains personal
information about a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal
information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” Id. at 1210.
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.81.5 and 1798.82. (2020).
131. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
132. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214.
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Similar to legislatures, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) references
“reasonable security” in the agency’s IoT device privacy and security
guidelines.133 Under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act,134 which allows the FTC to
sue companies for unfair or deceptive business practices, the FTC has made
efforts to hold companies liable for poor cybersecurity practices.135 In FTC
v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, for example, the FTC brought suit
against Wyndham Hotels under the act, citing specific practices that showed
the company failed to implement reasonable cybersecurity measures, leading
to multiple data breaches and theft of consumers’ personal data.136 The suit
resulted in an order for injunction requiring Wyndham to “establish and
implement and thereafter maintain a comprehensive information security
program . . . that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality
and integrity of cardholder data.”137 However, the Third Circuit also ruled
that there is no requirement for the FTC to put companies on notice and
publish regulations as to what meets the “reasonable security standards”
requirement. 138 While the court mentioned that industry standards can be
used to inform companies about what practices are reasonable,139 it did not
account for less straightforward scenarios in which it may be more difficult
to make a determination of reasonableness, such as instances a party cannot
show that specific cybersecurity practices that are inadequate.
D IS T E REASONA LENESS STANDARD EFFECTI E
As evidenced by the aforementioned healthcare breaches affecting at
least 10% of the United States population,140 and, in 2020, a four hundred
percent increase in cyberattacks after the novel coronavirus pandemic,141 the
flexible and malleable nature of the reasonableness standard has neither
reduced the chance of cyberattack nor incentivized companies to develop
133. “What constitutes reasonable security for a given device will depend on a number of factors,
including the amount and sensitivity of data collected, the sensitivity of the device’s functionality,
and the costs of remedying the security vulnerabilities.” Internet of Things – Privacy & Security in
a Connected World, FED. TRADE COMM’N 28 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshopentitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
135. Merritt Baer and Chinmayi Sharma, What Cybersecurity Standard Will a Judge Use in
Equifax Breach Suits, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whatcybersecurity-standard-will-judge-use-equifax-breach-suits.
136. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F. Supp. 3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2015).
137. Stipulated Order for Injunction at 4 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp, et al., 10
F.Supp.3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. 2:13-CV-01887-ES-JAD).
138. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 255–56.
139. Id. at 241.
140. See generally Greevy, supra note 100.
141. Monstercloud, Top Cyber Security Experts Report: 4,000 Cyber Attacks a Day Since
COVID-19 Pandemic, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 11, 2020 12:45 PM), https://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/top-cyber-security-experts-report-4-000-cyber-attacks-a-daysince-covid-19-pandemic-301110157.html.
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better cybersecurity programs. Incorporating reasonableness so frequently
into cybersecurity legislation is retributive rather than proactive because the
standard looks back at a company’s practices at the time of breach and only
reviews a company’s cybersecurity safeguards after one has occurred. 142
There is little proof that the reasonableness standard actually reduces security
breaches and incentivizes companies to take proper cybersecurity measures
prior to the onset of a cyberattack. Though companies bear the responsibility
of protecting their systems and devices from a cyberattack, they are not
sufficiently incentivized to allot funds to cybersecurity, 143 and as a result
companies rely on the ambiguity of the standard to support poor practices.144
Respectively, governments are hesitant to regulate cybersecurity
standards in the private sector even though more restrictive requirements and
stronger cyber defense initiatives are necessary for security. 145 When
governments do regulate, they use the confusing reasonableness standard
which “offer[s] little specificity as to how to achieve actual compliance.”146
Confusion is exacerbated for companies that operate at multi-national levels
because they have the unachievable task of determining what each
jurisdiction considers to be reasonable.147
The IoT Security Law fails to provide companies with a concrete
understanding of what constitutes a reasonable security feature. Like HIPAA,
the IoT Security Law does not provide a uniform set of technical
requirements or guidance for companies to follow, which allows companies
to prioritize savings over adequate cybersecurity. Manufacturers will
continue to use the flexible standard to their advantage, manipulating the
facts to show that its actions and practices can be construed as reasonable.
Further, because manufacturers use reasonableness to skirt the requirements
of the law and save money, the industry standard is diluted; the minimal
accepted requirements may not be a result of what companies in the industry
think is adequate to protect a cyberattack, but instead what is cost effective.
Minimal regulation of private sector companies fosters a mentality in
which companies do not prioritize the funding of cybersecurity measures and
view these expenses as externalities.148 Businesses fail to understand the need
142. See discussion supra Part I.A.
143. James Eastman, Avoiding Cyber-Pearl Harbor: Evaluating Government Efforts To
Encourage Private Sector Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Improvements, 18 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 515, 530 (2017).
144. Cheryl Wang, Information Privacy and Data Security Laws: An Ineffective Regulatory
Framework, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 31, 2017), https://blogs.cuit.columbia
.edu/culr/2017/10/31/information-privacy-and-data-security-laws-an-inefficient-regulatoryframework/.
145. See Eastman, supra note 143, at 522.
146. What are your Legal & Reasonable Obligations when it comes to Cybersecurity?, HALOCK,
https://www.halock.com/what-are-your-legal-obligations-when-it-comes-to-cybersecurity/
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2019).
147. See id.
148. See Eastman, supra note 143, at 530.
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for adequate cybersecurity measures because “they do not fully internalize
the benefits, while others may benefit by being ‘free rider[s].’”149
III PROPOSIN

A NEW STANDARD

Implementing the IoT Security Law with the reasonable language is
doomed to fail, as it will neither lessen the risk of breach, nor hold companies
accountable for poor cybersecurity practices. Additionally, the unique
structure and interconnectedness of IoT devices guarantees that a relaxed
standard will only compound the effects of cybercrime, as hackers will be
able to infiltrate multiple devices through a single point source. The IoT
Security Law must be rewritten to replace the reasonable standard with more
technical industry standards and best practices, implementing
recommendations promulgated from trade groups like the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST), along with findings from the FTC’s
staff report on the IoT. 150 Implementation of industry guidelines into the
statute, however, is no guarantee that companies will comply with the new
California law. More must be done to ensure that the statute does not sit idle
or is only invoked in the event of a cyberattack. Instead, California’s
legislature should look to the efforts of non-profit organizations such as
ICANN,151 an organization that handles both coordination of domain names
and IP numbers, as well as domain name dispute resolutions, as an example
of how to implement technical professionals to provide oversight and
guidance to IoT device manufacturers. Further, an established public
organization similar to that of ICANN should be created to regulate
manufacturers in a proactive way that minimizes both injury from
cyberattack and litigation after a cyberattack has occurred.
A INDUSTRY KNOWLED E AND EST PRACTICES AS A
REPLACEMENT FOR T E REASONA LENESS STANDARD
W
M

P

I TR
I

S

Industry standards152 and best practices are valuable tools because they
incorporate norms within a field and address what a particular industry
considers adequate. Industry standards are not customizable to an individual
149. Id. at 530.
150. Ieuan Jolly, FTC Recommends Privacy and Security Best Practices for the “Internet of
Things,” 20160513A NYCBAR 140, 140 (2015).
151. See generally IP2 Business Law Monographs 18.01, Copyright 2019, Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc.
152. “As the name implies, an industry standard is the average by which those in a particular field
govern themselves. It is the ordinary manner of doing things in that field and can serve to establish
different things in various legal settings.” What is the Relevance of “Industry Standards” Under the
Law?, HG LEGAL.ORG LEGAL RESS., https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-the-relevance-ofindustry-standards-under-the-law-36794 (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
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company, but arise from a general consensus as to what is acceptable in daily
practice. 153 Further, industry standards prevent courts from viewing a
company in a vacuum, and instead gauge performance in relation to what
those within the practice are doing and deem acceptable. 154 Accepted
industry standards, while not necessarily binding unless present in statute,
can potentially provide clarity to courts when assessing liability. 155 The
invocation of industry standards often arises in the context of tort and contract
litigation.156 In personal injury litigation, for example, safety standards are
used to determine whether a defendant has been negligent.157 By relying on
business practices present within an industry, courts can establish the duty of
care that a defendant owes to a plaintiff in preventing an accident. 158 These
standards are developed “by consensus,”159 and enable courts to rule not only
consistently, but in a way that recognizes the complexities and differences
among industries.
In many ways, the duty of care in preventing an accident is similar to a
duty to prevent a cyberbreach or cyberattack. Scholars have proposed a new
tort of “negligent enablement” 160 that holds software vendors liable for
failure to incorporate reasonable security measures into their products and
services.161 The need for liability in the context of cybersecurity is warranted,
given that vendors and manufacturers are better able to protect against
cyberbreaches than product users.162
However, many judges lack technical competency and are unfamiliar
with the topic of cybersecurity, thus making it difficult for courts to
accurately assess whether a company has undertaken “reasonable
cybersecurity measures” in the manufacture of its IoT devices. Though the
America Bar Association has, in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
incorporated a duty to be competent in technology to “keep abreast of

153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Thilo Schmidt, The legal significance of standards, DIN, https://www.din.de/en/aboutstandards/standards-and-the-law/legal-significance-of-standards (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
156. What is the Relevance of “Industry Standards” Under the Law?, supra note 154.
157. Harry M. Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE
DAME L.REV. 1, 1 (1965).
158. The notion of relying on industry standards is not novel to the courts. Judge Learned Hand
famously spoke to courts’ reliance on industry best practices to determine negligence. “There are,
no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice of the . . . [industry] the standard of
proper diligence; we have indeed given some currency to the notion ourselves. . .” The T.J. Hooper,
60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
159. Philo, supra note 158, at 3–4.
160. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1153, 1553 (2005).
161. Id. at 1557–8.
162. Id. at 1558.
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changes in law and practice,” these rules do not extend to judges.163 The ABA
and many state judicial conduct codes are instead devoid of any duty or
requirement to understand technology or cybersecurity. 164 Evaluating
whether an IoT manufacturer has built its device with “reasonable” security
features requires a level of technological understanding that many judges
cannot comprehend without guidance from professionals or experts.
Replacing the reasonableness standard in the IoT Security Law with industry
best practices will promote consistency and more accurate results, as judges
will use these heightened and more technical requirements to guide them in
the decision-making process. Courts will thus be required to issue decisions
that align with what industry experts have deemed acceptable.
IoT technology industry best practices provide guidance as to what
technologists consider adequate cybersecurity measures, given the cost of
implementing security features and the prevalence of cyberattacks within the
industry. Established industry best practices in the IoT Security Law will
safeguard against courts’ and governments’ inability to understand the
nuances of IoT technology.
U
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Many critics question the role of government in the regulation of
technology, especially when industry curated standards reflect a better
understanding of acceptable practices. Self-regulation schemes in the private
security and military industries have grown to reflect the development of the
industry,165 as companies issue “codes of conduct” that apply to the entirety
of an industry.166 Enforcement of industry standards within these sectors is
successful through voluntary self-compliance,167 as companies recognize the
collective benefit when individual companies adhere to codes of conduct
developed by trade associations.168 Self-regulation within the private security
and military industries is not, however, without fault. Some question the
efficacy of sanctions and the extent of individual accountability in any private
industry.169 Self-regulation can lead to opportunistic behavior in which actors

163. Robert Ambrogi, It’s Time to Extend the Duty of Tech Competence to Judges, EVOLVE L.
(May 6, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/legal-innovation-center/2019/05/06/it-is-time-to-extendthe-duty-of-tech-competence-to-judges/?rf=1.
164. Id.
165. See Daphne Richemond-Barak, Can Self-Regulation Work? Lessons From the Private
Sector and Military Industry, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 773, 779 (2014).
166. Id. at 776.
167. Id. at 778.
168. Renee De Nevers, The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Security and Military
Industry, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y 119, 220-221 (2010).
169. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 165, at 792.
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who choose not to comply with the industry norms abuse their privileges
while remaining undetected.170
It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which the IoT device industry,
and even the technology industry as a whole, succumbs to opportunistic
behavior by individual actors. Self-regulation of privacy has proven itself to
be a failure,171 as a lack of accountability, transparency, and consequences
encourage noncompliance. 172 Self-regulation may lead the government to
place too much trust in the private sector. As early as the Clinton
Administration’s 1997 “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,”173 the
government has been reluctant to regulate technology, and instead has
encouraged it to grow unchecked. 174 The Clinton framework referenced
government involvement when “needed” and stated that in promoting
commerce, its role was to provide support via a “predictable legal
environment.” 175 “Where governmental involvement is needed,” the
Framework continued, “its aim should be to support and enforce a
predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple legal environment for
commerce.” 176 Depending on the policy goals of an administration,
government deference to self-regulation can instead lead companies to
maximize profits rather than devote a portion of expenditures to
cybersecurity. 177 More recently under the Trump Administration, the
Department of Transportation advocated for reduced self-regulation in the
context of “autonomous vehicle cybersecurity technology.”178
170. Id. at 793.
171. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6
ISJLP 355, 356 (2011).
172. Id. at 366.
173. President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce, WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 1997), https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov
/WH/New/Commerce/read.html.
174. The Clinton Administration’s position regarding the proliferation of the Internet was that
“[g]overnments should encourage industry self-regulation private sector leadership” and “avoid
undue restrictions on electronic commerce.” “[P]arties should be able to enter into legitimate
agreements to buy and sell products and services across the Internet with minimal government
involvement or intervention.” A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce Executive Summary,
WHITE HOUSE, https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/summary.html (last
visited Aug. 23, 2020). Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Huddleston Skees, & Adam Thierer, Soft Law for
Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 37, 85 (2018).
175. Hagemann, Huddleston Skees, & Thierer, supra note 174, at 86.
176. President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce, WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 1997), https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/
WH/New/Commerce/read.html.
177. The Darkening Storm of Cyberterrorism: International Policy Adaptation for Automotive
Cybersecurity Regulations, 59 JURIMETRICS J 267, 289 (2019).
178. Frighteningly, the DOT has championed a mentality that fails to comprehend the long-term
implications of inferior cybersecurity protections, and instead looks to encourage “new entrants” to
the market. 149 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AUTOMATED DRIVING
SYSTEMS 2.0, at i, 1 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069aads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf.
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A multi-stakeholder initiative can be an effective solution to the issue of
poor cybersecurity practices. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the Act) is one
example in which collaboration between the private and public sector has
resulted in the strengthening of cybersecurity programs.179 Under the Obama
Administration, the Act provided a channel for communication between the
government and the private sector that allowed entities to share cybersecurity
threat information in a way similar to that shared within the industry. 180
Relying on the framework of a voluntary sharing program, the Act authorizes
companies to share information with the Department of Homeland
Security. 181 This information is used by the government to develop
cybersecurity tools and fight cyberattacks in both the private and public
sectors.182 Extending a multi-regulatory scheme to IoT device regulation is
one possible way to remove the ambiguity and ineffectiveness associated
with the standard of reasonableness. In reconstructing the IoT Security Law’s
cybersecurity regulations, the California legislature must incorporate these
types of solutions to ensure that the statute encourages IoT device
manufacturers to implement appropriate cybersecurity measures. This
requires collaboration with existing resources, like NIST’s IoT cybersecurity
framework, as well as conversations with technologists in the industry. In
contrast to the current policy in the United States, international government
regulation and active participation in the development of industry standards
in has resulted in the creation of “privacy covenants,” which represent a
fruitful intersection between the government and trade standard
regulations.183 The Dutch Data Protection Authority, for example, reviews
privately developed codes to ensure compliance with Dutch statutes,184 thus
striking a balance between industry expertise and government oversight.
At the federal level, the FTC has addressed IoT security via privacy and
security best practices and recommendations for the IoT.185 Focusing on the
See also The Darkening Storm of Cyberterrorism: International Policy Adaptation for Automotive
Cybersecurity Regulations, supra note 178.
179. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2935-85
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2017)).
180. What You Need to Know About the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, LATHAM & WATKINS:
CLIENT ALERT COMMENT. (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lwCybersecurity-Act-of-2015.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. These privacy covenants aim to enforce Dutch data protection laws among industries by
inviting the private sector to develop industry codes for processing personal data in relevant
respective industries. Rubinstein, supra note 172, at 400.
184. Id.
185. This seventy-one page staff report, issued by the FTC in 2015, addressed the rise of IoT
devices within various industries, in addition to the risks and benefits of the IoT device industry on
trade and business practices. Notably, and perhaps problematically, “the report does not discuss
devices sold in a business-to-business context . . .” Though not to be addressed in this note, the
report’s failure to discuss business-to-business interactions could potentially cause concern that
while the Federal and California governments’ aim of the legislation and reports are to protect
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implications of poor IoT device security and the effect on privacy, the FTC
staff report detailed the application of traditional privacy principles to the
industry. 186 The first portion of the report discusses how existing privacy
guidelines from the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP) can be
applied in the IoT space.187 Notable is the “Commission Staff’s Views and
Recommendations for Best Practices,”188 which articulates the FTC staff’s
perspective and recommendations for implementing data security features for
IoT devices. While the FTC staff expresses the general consensus that there
should be reasonable security features,189 the report goes further and specifies
security best practices that companies should consider implementing into
daily operations and manufacturing of the IoT devices.190 Though the report
only suggests implementation of these practices, it also warns businesses that
the FTC can hold companies to these standards via enforcement actions and
existing data privacy legislation.191
NIST AS A FRAMEWORK AND STANDARD FOR CALIFORNIA IOT
DE ICE RE ULATION
To adequately address its policy goals and enact an effective statute,
California must look to guidance from NIST in the redrafting of its IoT device
security guidelines.192 NIST plays a critical role in the marriage of private
sector and government cybersecurity practices through its publications,
which detail best practices and recommendations for various science and
consumers, failing to regulate IoT devices in this context may not achieve the intended result of
reducing cyberattacks and the associated costs with resulting data breaches. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
INTERNET OF THINGS – PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 6 (Jan. 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-reportnovember-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
186. Id. at 19–26.
187. FIPPs are a series of five privacy principles that are rooted in the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) report from 1973. These principles include Notice/
Awareness, Choice/ Consent, Access/ Participation, Integrity/ Security and Enforcement/Redress.
Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, 592 (2014). See generally Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),
FED. TRADE COMM’N (March 9, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm.
188. INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 186 at 27–46.
189. Id. at 27.
190. The FTC staff report identifies six security best practices that companies should implement
in aiming for a “reasonable security” program. These include: (1) security by design, (2) personnel
practices, (3) retention of service providers that are also capable of reasonable security practices,
(4) a defense-in-depth approach that meets security levels via tools like encryption, (5) reasonable
access control monitoring procedures, and (6) security monitoring throughout the entirety of a life
cycle. Id. at 28-32.
191. Jolly, supra note 150, at 140.
192. Founded in 1901, NIST “is responsible for establishing technology, standards, and metrics
to be applied to the science and technology industries.” Notably, NIST is a multi-dimensional body,
as it not only issues recommendations for standards, but is one of the country’s oldest science labs
and a part of the United States Department of Commerce. Martin Horan, What is NIST?
Understanding Why You Need to Comply, FTP TODAY (May 22, 2019), https://
www.ftptoday.com/blog/what-is-nist.
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technology industries.193 The standards developed by NIST are derived from
conversations among those industry organizations, as well as documents like
security publications. 194 Through its best practice guidelines, NIST
champions an active dialogue approach. 195 These conversations led the
federal government to incorporate NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework into its
recommendations and policies to strengthen and secure critical infrastructure
within the United States,196 such as town electricity, gas, sewage, and water
systems. 197 Those who support NIST assert that each guide “harmonizes
industry best practices,” 198 via a “flexible and cost-effective approach to
enhancing cybersecurity.”199 As a result, NIST guidelines are valuable and
have been used by private and public entities as a means of “assessing and
managing cyber risk.”200 Some governments even consider the Cybersecurity
Framework mandatory in the context of critical infrastructure.201
In May 2020, NIST released a draft of its “Foundational Cybersecurity
Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers” guide,202 which highlights industry
best practices for IoT devices and provides a reference point for
manufacturers to start implementation of adequate cybersecurity features.203
The NIST Framework focuses on device and data security, first, by
highlighting the vulnerabilities in IoT devices 204 and identifying six core
security features for manufacturers to address during device development.205
193. Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, and Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A Comparison of
“Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J 217, 221 (2016).
194. Nate Lord, What is NIST Compliance?, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-nist-compliance.
195. See Shackelford, Russell & Haut, supra note 193, at 222-23.
196. Id. at 223.
197. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, PIVOT POINT
SEC.: INFOSEC STRATEGIES (last updated May 25, 2017), https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/
blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework/.
198. Shackelford, Russell, & Haut, supra note 193, at 222. [Scott Shackelford, Scott Russell and
Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J 217, 222 (2016).]
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Many municipal governments state that if “cybersecurity practices were ever questioned
during litigation or a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for ‘due diligence’ was now the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework.” Verry, supra note 197.
202. Michael Fagan et al., Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers
(May 2020) (National Institute of Standards and Technology), NISTIR 8259,
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2020/NIST.IR.8259.pdf.
203. “The NIST Baseline takes these considerations to the manufacturing side, offering (as NIST
describes it) to help IoT device manufacturers ‘understand the cybersecurity risks their customers
face’ so IoT devices can provide the minimal features to make them securable.” Steven Augustino,
Securing IoT Devices (Part 2): Inside the NIST Guidance Document for IoT Device Manufacturers,
JD SUPRA (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/securing-iot-devices-part-2-insidethe-94616/.
204. Id.
205. These core security features include device identification, device configuration, data
protection, logical access to interfaces, software and firmware updates, and cybersecurity event
logging. Id.
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NIST recommendations, while not typically binding, can encourage the
private sector to adopt appropriate security measures that minimize the threat
of attack through strict requirements and public-private sector
collaboration.206 Failing to implement appropriate cybersecurity features can
lose a company business, damage its reputation, and affect performance
levels within the institution.207 While NIST compliance can provide an added
layer of assurance that a company has implemented adequate cybersecurity
measures,208 it can also provide peace of mind to customers and government
agencies by reassuring them that even in the event of a cyberattack, a
company has done the best it can to secure its infrastructure and protect data.
The notoriety of NIST guidelines among technical professionals and
industries makes implementation of standards set forth in the “Core
Cybersecurity Feature Baseline for Securable IoT Devices” guidelines
particularly appealing. The NIST framework incorporates language that
“invokes personal responsibility of users by looking to make basic
cybersecurity best practices common knowledge.”209 Thus, these guidelines
can provide customers with educational tools necessary to hold companies
accountable for their data and cybersecurity practices. 210 Finally, NIST is
valuable in that its frameworks provide well-defined and clear technical
guidelines that specify what is sufficient to effectively counter a cyberattack.
California should implement the NIST framework into the IoT Security Law
to create a concrete set of guidelines for industries to follow and allow for
consistent enforcement of the statute.
C

EYOND T E LE ISLATION: ENSURIN
RE ULATORY COALITION

COMPLIANCE IA

Implementation of industry standards and best practices to California’s
IoT Security Law is only part of the solution to ensure IoT device
manufacturers adopt heightened cybersecurity requirements. Per the statute,
the Attorney General is responsible for investigating and penalizing IoT
manufacturers for failure to adhere to the law,211 and usually, government
entities do not investigate and enforce until after the cyberattack and breach
has occurred. Additionally, because case law surrounding the IoT Security

206.
207.
208.
209.

See Horan, supra note 192.
Id.
Lord, supra note 194.
Jared Magill, The Crooked Path to Determining Liability in Data Breach Cases, WIRED
https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/03/crooked-path-determining-liability-data-breach-cases/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
210. See generally id.
211. John P. Rondini, The Countdown Begins on California’s “Internet of Things” Law,
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=24ba314b-cf82418b-a6a6-0b3ac7fdbd64.
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Law is nonexistent,212 a company may wait to implement adequate security
features until the courts have provided guidance to ensure compliance. In
some sense, the unintended consequences of the IoT statute parallels the
effects of retributive sentences in criminal law. While “retributive justice,”
or punishment for one’s actions is a valid objective, some argue that it
conflicts with other preventive goals, such as minimizing or preventing
“antisocial behavior.”213 Through the retributive justice framework, conduct
is regulated via punishment after an act occurs, with an underlying
assumption that it will “eliminate the occurrence” of a particular wrong.214
Would a similar model, then, incentivize companies to take the appropriate
measures prior to punishment from the Attorney General? It seems doubtful
because, as discussed earlier, legislation up until this point has failed to
effectively remedy the issue.
To ensure compliance prior to a statutory violation, California must
create a regulatory body to evaluate and oversee adherence to industry best
practices. ICANN and its role in administration of the internet and disputes215
can serve as a model for a potential state entity to review and confirm IoT
device compliance prior to a cyberbreach or attack. While ICANN primarily
shares responsibility in the coordination and maintenance of internet protocol
addresses, it also plays a role in policy.216 ICANN thus ensures the internet
runs smoothly and securely among all participants. 217 A similarly created
state and non-profit coalition, consisting of technical professionals as well as
lawyers, would push IoT device manufacturers to take preventative measures
to implement adequate security features and remain cognizant of the IoT
Security Law. This coalition will not only utilize its professional expertise to
specifically determine the technical standards that comprise industry best
practices but will also monitor these companies to ensure the cybersecurity
best practices are implemented.

212. Stacy Higginbotham, Is the world ready for California’s new IoT laws?, STACEY ON IOT
(Dec. 2, 2019), https://staceyoniot.com/is-the-world-ready-for-californias-new-iot-laws/.
213. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U.L.
REV. 655, 672–73 (2006). IoT manufacturers may, for example, exhibit antisocial behavior by
undertaking poor cybersecurity practices at the expenses of other companies who try to implement
adequate measures.
214. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV 961, 1007
(Feb. 2001).
215. What does ICANN do?, ICANN AT-LARGE, https://atlarge.icann.org/about/what-doesicann-do (last visited Dec. 25, 2019).
216. The organization also “facilitates the process of policy development that will enable
technical changes to how the unique identifiers are run.” Id.
217. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The IoT Security Law went into effect on January 1, 2020, and though
the state is the first to hold companies accountable to requisite cybersecurity
standards for IoT devices, 218 the law does so by implementing the ill-defined
standard of reasonableness. By incorporating the reasonableness standard
into the law, the California legislature provides little guidance to the Attorney
General and courts as to what constitutes adequate cybersecurity
protections. 219 Without stringent security requirements and a better
understanding of whether a company is taking the correct steps to implement
appropriate security features, there is a real threat that the legislation will be
ineffective.220
The California legislature must significantly revamp the Internet Security
Law to include more rigorous IoT industry standard security requirements,
as well as develop a regulatory coalition of technical and legal professionals
to ensure compliance prior to breach. By shifting the legislation’s retributive
approach to one of proactivity via government and private collaboration, a
compliance model based on industry standards is better equipped to protect
consumer information passing through the IoT network.
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